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Abstract. This paper addresses some of the contours of an ethics of 
knowledge as it aligns with the more specific projects of ameliorative 
epistemology. Ameliorative epistemology describes projects aimed at 
redressing epistemic injustices, improving collective epistemic practices, and 
educating more effectively for higher-order reflective reasoning skills and the 
cooperative problem-solving which they afford. Social epistemologists, it is 
first argued, need to become more risk-aware, and the remaining sections of 
the chapter elaborate different aspects of the relationship between epistemic 
risk and doxastic responsibility. More positively, social epistemologists 
involved in such ameliorative projects need to provide guidance for agents 
which helps foster critical reflection, and the evolution of cooperation. These 
complementary critical and ameliorative tasks are argued to be key aspects 




Section 1. Introduction: Amelioration and the Ethics of Knowledge 
This chapter will outline some of the contours of an ethics of knowledge as I understand it, and 
will argue for  need for philosophers to take a “risk aware” stance towards epistemic practices, 
and to offer greater support for ameliorative projects, including especially the evolution of 
cooperation.1 An ethics of knowledge would address knowledge claims, knowledge production, 
dissemination, gatekeeping,  power relations and other topics, and overlap with contemporary 
topics in social epistemology. Ameliorative projects are those which have aims of ameliorating 
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epistemic injustices and promoting the critical reasoning dispositions. I will treat discussion of 
the ethics of knowledge as a kind of “applied” philosophy, at least insofar as invites guidance to 
real-world agents as inquirers. In some sense all educational efforts are ameliorative, but the 
ameliorative projects of applied social epistemology aim especially at cultivating in agents 
effective tools for dealing with problems of life, with diverse and contrary systems of belief, and 
with uncertainty. Ameliorative epistemologists hold that promoting not just true beliefs, but also 
emotional and moral sensitivities, and effective, co-operative  problem-solving are vitally needed 
today. Ameliorative projects illustrate one intersection between zetetic responsibilism and the 
ethics of knowledge, and this intersection will be the focus of the current chapter.  
Risk and responsibility are closely entwined, yet conceptual connections between them need of 
elucidation.  Riskiness in people’s moral and intellectual judgments invites examination, and can 
often be studied social scientifically; comparatively risky strategies of acquiring and maintaining 
beliefs is connected censure of agents for adopting unsound habits of inquiry.  
Dewey sometimes characterized philosophy, as he understood it, as “critique of bias.”  
Critique and censure may apply to agents whose strategies of inquiry mirror known biases, or ill-
fit their own questions and subject-matter. But the focus of our study remains largely positive: 
Taking responsibility for our epistemic practices is something ameliorative epistemologists want 
to encourage; this can cause commotion, discomfort, even crisis, as it leads to scrutiny of one’s 
own assumptions and problem-solving strategies. An ethics of knowledge ought to provide 
insights on personal and institutional responsibility. This is the self-cultivation concern, the 
concern for developing intellectual, moral, and emotional sensitivities and abilities.  
Section 2 explains the call for social epistemology to be risk aware, and argues that zetetic 
epistemology, or “inquiry-focused” epistemology, is able to support this better than some other 
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approaches, internalist or externalist. My task in this paper is partly to extend the zetetic approach 
to take account of, and to contribute to, Candiotto’s conception of the social dimensions of the 
ethics of knowledge. Section 3 will focus on Charlie Crerar’s claim that there are important 
asymmetries between virtue ascriptions and vice ascriptions, asymmetries which prevalent forms 
of virtue ethics and epistemology have not been adequately attentive to. These asymmetries affect 
how philosophers ought to treat intellectual in comparison with moral character-traits and trait-
ascriptions. In order to assess Crerar’s suggestions for improving character epistemology by taking 
better account of these asymmetries, we will need to pass through a thicket of thorny issues with 
respect to the meaning and function of “thick” evaluative concepts.2 We discuss thick normative 
concepts are tools for inquirers, and how engaged agents utilize thick concepts, concepts which 
typically entwine description and a positive or negative valence.3 More specifically we will 
investigate certain recently-alleged asymmetries between virtue and vice ascriptions, and argue 
that recognizing these asymmetries actually aids ameliorative epistemology, by helping to 
separating the “censure” or “critique of bias” which makes for a constructive reply that is the 
appropriate response in the majority of cases, from over-strong association with blame.  
Section 4 provides discussion of cooperative vices, and in particular the vice which David 
Hume described as “knavery.” Hume’s little-noticed discussion of knavery is a forerunner of 
contemporary game theory’s concern with behavior of ‘free riding’ on systems of trust or 
cooperation.  There are many examples of this, including non-cooperation on mask-wearing and 
vaccinations in a time of pandemic. Studying knavery, individual or corporate, and the 
objectively less and more risky choices of cooperators and non-cooperators in game scenarios 
like Tragedy of the Commons, helps us recognize impediments to ameliorative epistemology.  
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Our discussion of knavery invites a broader discussion over social dimensions of an 
ethics of knowledge, including the legitimacy of ‘nudges,’ and the broader debate over the 
legitimacy of epistemically paternalistic practices.  Epistemic paternalists and their anti-
paternalistic critics might both claim that their views reflect the aims of ameliorative 
epistemology, making this debate one of special interest for the ethics of knowledge. This is the 
topic of Section 5. I show how debate over epistemically paternalistic practices and their 
legitimacy raises questions central to the ethics of knowledge. I argue that the design or 
management of epistemic environments must value individual autonomy, such that 
paternalistically-justified interventions to one’s inquiry are not merely manipulations that save 
people “from their own folly,” as epistemic paternalists have argued, but also facilitate 
cultivation of virtues of good inquirers. Section 6 then winds up the chapter by arguing that 
individual growth as responsible inquirers, and not just right thinking or correct judgment, is 
central to epistemology as inquiry. This somewhat anti-veritistic conclusion with clarification of 
how the guidance-giving tasks of ameliorative epistemology are able to draw support from 
empirical study of the ecological nature of rationality, and to apply both non-ideal and ideal 
theories of epistemic agency.4 
 
Section 2. Emotional Support: Emotions, Virtues, and the Evolution of Cooperation 
Following what some describe as was a nasty break-up with the fact/value dichotomy, 
epistemologists have been looking for some emotional support. As Laura Candiotto argues, 
emotions support the development and cultivation of doxastic responsibility, responsibility 
“towards truth in our social world, and should thus also be central to the development of the 
ethics of knowledge. In this regard, extent cooperation leads to epistemic transformations, as 
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processes of redesigning cognitive environments through the emergence of new and different 
abilities.”5 
 In tandem with pragmatism and enactivists, virtue theorists like Candiotto view emotions 
as ever-present in cognition and human judgment across the Kantian division between practical 
and theoretical reason.6 While emotions along with values were seen almost exclusively as 
hinderances to objectivity and sound judgment in the heyday of logical positivist thought, their 
necessity and value is today widely accepted in the humanities and human sciences.  
The sharp divide between analytic and emotional processing – a very unempirical 
assumption of many an empiricist – was reinforced by a fact/value dichotomy, and led on far 
more philosophically hostile to conceiving psychology as irrelevant to logic(s) and the “social” 
which the human sciences study as irrelevant to the “rational” (the “logic of science”). But 
philosophy of science, we can once again confidently assert, is not philosophy enough as the 
positivists held, and theory-choice is not merely algorithmic. Neither explanation nor theory-
choice in the science is not aided by a value-free conception of objectivity. Explanations embody 
questions, and value-charged interests in explanation; theory-choice among extant theories that 
are roughly equal in terms of empirical adequacy is dependent upon qualitative weighing of 
ampliative criteria, describable the central “theory virtues” (virtues of robustness, fruitfulness, 
etc.). With the fact/value dichotomy in place it was not only difficult for philosophers to address 
the normative or evaluative tasks of epistemology and ethics, but also the overlaps of theories, 
aims, and methods across these subfields of philosophy. As Alvin Goldman points out, while but 
a few decades ago ethics and epistemology were “positioned in opposite corners of the 
philosophical establishment, the former the epitome of ‘theoretical’ philosophy and the latter the 
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epitome of ‘practical’ philosophy, with little contact made between them, today an active interest 
in both analogies and disanalogies between ethics and epistemology abounds.”7 
Goldman’s comment helps us to put into context how a de-coupling of philosophy from 
the fact/value dichotomy has gone hand in hand with rediscovery of necessity of emotional 
dispositions in embodied cognition, and with greater appreciation of the generally positive roles 
which emotion in human development, moral and intellectual. Emotional intelligence promotes 
effective problem-solving and the evolution of social cooperation. Psychological study of 
emotional intelligence and social intelligence has done much to illustrate how emotion and affect 
are partners in the achievements both of reflective morality and intellectual inquiry. Eastern 
virtue traditions, which emphasize the challenge of moral and intellectual “self-cultivation,” also 
speak to this entwinement of emotional development and sound judgment as well. Without well-
developed moral emotions, it would be near impossible for an agent to recognize their being in a 
situation of moral conflict or dilemma.  
Awareness of these aspects of a situation is enabled through normal emotional 
development, and without them we would simply act from the stronger motive, or if reflective, 
apply a moral principle or follow a moral rule. The study of psycho and socio-pathologies, 
psychologists have found, often leads back to abnormalities in the development of core moral 
emotions such as sympathy, empathy, and antipathy. In philosophy today, the clash continues 
between non-cognitivism and cognitivism, or realism and fictionalism, etc. as meta-ethical 
theories;  but ethicists are no longer tempted to frame the debate in terms of the fact/value 
dichotomy. Without the enabling effect of what Candiotto terms epistemic emotions, agents 
would lack sensitivity to epistemic means and methods. Similarly, without appreciation of the 
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role of emotion for cognition, philosophical accounts the “search” for knowledge, understanding, 
and wisdom might be similarly derailed.  
The rejection of the fact/value dichotomy is implied also by Candiotto and Dreon’s 
(2021) acceptance of the language of habits, including affective habits. “The Classical 
Pragmatists, in contrast to the behaviorist account of habits as a mechanical reaction to stimuli, 
stressed the creative power of habits to scaffold human behaviors. According to this view, habits 
play a positive role in supporting and orienting human sensibility, as well as in sustaining and 
nourishing cognition” (1). The authors find that the Deweyan focus on habits re-orients the 
debate from objects to interactions, and they draw strong support from Dewey for the view that 
“affectivity is a permanent feature of the active human experience of the world, supported by 
habits” (2). Taking affective scaffolding – those resources that set up, drive, and regularly 
contribute to affective regulation – as “habits” in the pragmatist sense, Candiotto and Dreon 
argue helps philosophers “to better appreciate affective habits’ cognitive function, and to avoid 
reducing them to a bodily matter.” It helps us “emancipate ourselves from a passive and routine 
view of scaffolded affectivity so as to bring the habits’ power of transformation into the 
spotlight” (4).8  
Candiotto’s account of emotions is also informed by virtue theory, and by enactivist 
psychology. Virtue theory, or the study of character traits, has been revitalized in part because it 
directly addresses similarities (and differences) between the evaluative tasks which normative 
epistemology and normative ethics respectively engage. Candiotto ties virtue theory with 
enactivism, and the idea that “sense-making is the enactive notion of cognition in general; 
and participatory sense-making is enactive social cognition.”9 This combination of views brings 
empirical studies of the social evolution of cooperation into focus, and into partnership with the 
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normative project she refers to as the ethics of knowledge. The recognition of the roles which 
emotions play in people’s intellectual as well as moral development, has contributed to 
overcoming the sharp disparities once held to hold between practical and theoretical reason. The 
development of epistemic character and doxastic responsibility “assumes knowledge as an 
ethical commitment and brings the scientific results at the service of society” while also 
promoting rational thinking dispositions and ‘unmasking’ dogmatic or totalitarian thought. 
In summary, pragmatist, enactivist, and aretaic theories are of course only a few of the 
alternatives to what they see as ‘half-hearted’ empiricisms that build in a fact/value dichotomy, 
or related bifurcations which make emotional and axiological contributions to theoretical 
judgment more difficult to see. I have argued elsewhere that marrying pragmatism to virtue 
theory is advantageous to both, and this chapter affords me a welcome opportunity to further 
develop a unique form of character epistemology I term zetetic responsibilism, housed within a 
conception of epistemology as theory of inquiry. In the remaining sections I compare it with 
some other accounts, and try to show how it approaches a number of questions central to the 
ethics of knowledge. 
 
Section 3. Putting the Occurrent/Characterological Ascription Distinction to Work 
While some Western philosophers have been detractors of aretaic approaches in philosophy, 
others have adopted a virtue-theoretic approach, yet looked for alternatives to its predominant 
articulation. Situationist thinkers (Olin and Doris; Alfano; Ahlstrom-Vij) have tended to be 
especially critical of the “pure virtue theory” of Linda Zagzebski’s highly influential Virtues of 
the Mind (1996), which is neo-Aristotelian for the manner in which it conceives intellectual 
virtue as a subset of moral virtue, as Aristotle understood them. So has Quassim Cassam, in his 
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more recent but equally influential Vices of the Mind (2019). There is concern that Zagzebskian 
character epistemology, which I have elsewhere referred to as phronomic virtue responsibilism 
for the central role it allots to personages taken as exemplars of moral virtue, is seen as setting an 
unrealistic and overly moralized conception of intellectual virtues. It is sometimes seen as 
driving responsibilist and reliabilist approaches in epistemology apart, rather than combining or 
uniting them. 
Moreover, Cassam and Crerar both want us to be cautious of impugning people’s 
motives, which they think the Zagzebskian account invites. They are thus at pains to show that 
vice attribution, as part of epistemological assessment of agents and groups, is unlike ‘vice 
charging’ in heated public debate, where poor or defective motives are often foremost. As 
Cassam points out, “Vice explanations can themselves be epistemically vicious to the extent that 
they make it harder to understand people whose lives, values and political preferences are very 
different from our own.”  
This worry applies to vice ascriptions and explanations as the folk often make them, but it 
may also apply to philosophers. Cassam is pointing out that we are not immune from it: “Vice 
explanations imply that the epistemically vicious suffer from a form of false consciousness but 
there is also a type of false consciousness to which some vice epistemologists as susceptible…. 
[V]ice explanations of recent political events are problematic in a number of ways. They tend to 
underestimate the significance of other factors, and are at odds with the principle that a 
democratic culture is one in which citizens assume that their fellow citizens have good reasons, 
or at any rate reasons, for acting as they do.”10 This is one of a number of points in a recent paper 
where Cassam rethinks some of the assumptions of his own earlier development of vice 
epistemology which he now thinks were flawed. Cassam now more carefully distinguishes vice 
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attributions from rhetorical vice-charging: “However, ‘vice-charging’ sounds more heated and 
accusatory than merely judging that another person is epistemically vicious. Vice attributions are 
judgements. They have an evaluative dimension but needn’t be accusatory.”11  
Charlie Crerar (2018) makes a related challenge to a set of assumptions he identifies in 
Zagzebski’s work, and in much self-described character epistemology. Crerar is sympathetic to 
character epistemology, but wants to challenge a set of assumptions about symmetry in the 
attribution of virtues and vices to an agent, and in the attribution of intellectual vices, in 
particular. His account thus adds substantial detail to the worries that we saw Cassam raise. 
Crerar’s central worry is what he terms the Inversion thesis: “that in a range of theoretically 
significant ways, virtue and vice are straightforward opposites” (754). Among more specific 
claims associated with this thesis, commonly endorsed but rarely explicated or defended, is that 
the vices are (simply) inversions of vices, having otherwise the same structure. “Thus, Linda 
Zagzebski grounds criticism of intellectual vices in a ‘defect of motivation’ (1996: 209).”  
As Crerar details in the work of Zagzebski and many other responsibilists, a “defect” of 
motivation and/or effort as a basic characterization of the intellectually vicious is an assumption 
which has been common. Intellectual (including more narrowly epistemic) virtues have a truth-
connected epistemic motivation, and so vices are to be modeled on a lack, or defect in proper 
motivation.12 For Zagzebski, virtues are ‘‘deep traits’’ (p. 89) or dispositions of persons, and thus 
vices will be as well. While this account helps to deliver the blameworthiness of vice, in contrast 
perhaps to simple error or non-culpable or non-willful ignorance, Crerar is skeptical of the tight 
symmetry which the Inversion thesis expresses. Crerar seems right that debate over the 
Asymmetry thesis may have important implications for the study of virtue and vice, moral and 
epistemic.13  Are vice attributions properly seen as mirroring virtue attributions in the suggested 
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way? If such a symmetry holds for moral virtues and vices, is it unproblematic to take it as 
equally sound for intellectual virtues and vices? Bringing empirical studies to bear, Crerar 
contends that intellectual vice “does not require a defective motivational state, either in the form 
of the presence of a motivation towards epistemic bads or the absence of motivation towards 
epistemic goods. Rather, the badness and blameworthiness of these character traits can be 
derived from other psychological and, perhaps, non-psychological features.”  
  Crerar like Cassam appears to be looking for alternatives in more naturalist approaches 
than Zagzebski or the neo-Aristotelian provide, with the implication that study of vices is better 
off without the Inversion thesis.14 While I find Crerar’s criticisms of the Inversion thesis and its 
associated “motivational approach” rather convincing, his paper is largely critical, and does not 
get far in supplying alternatives. It appears to leave epistemologists caught between the vice 
consequentialism of Cassam, where motivational and developmental issues are perhaps under-
regarded, and the neo-Aristotelian account where flawed or simply absent motivations are 
perhaps over-ascribed to agents, since motivations are so central to the dispositional account of 
virtue and vice Zagzebski and some other character epistemologists employ. Crerar expresses 
hopes that we can develop middle positions in character epistemology allowing for the 
importance of emotions, both moral emotions and epistemic emotions, and this is where I would 
like to make some additional suggestions, while avoiding the inversion thesis. 
This is where I would like to suggest further alternatives and resources. A first alternative 
that I will just mention is that the supplementation of virtue theory with embodiment theory 
together help to tie the cultivation of moral and epistemic emotions to cooperative problem-
solving, and cooperative or pro-social virtues. One alternative may be to employ a taxonomy 
such as John Maier (2020) supplies. While I will take this taxonomy as consistent with the 
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language of habits, including those of affective scaffolding we endorsed earlier,  “Powers” is 
taken by Maier to be the most general concept, with Dispositions, Abilities, and Affordances its 
multiply-related major sub-types.15 According to Maier, abilities (and competence-performance 
attributions) and other normative attributions are pertinent to agents, not non—agents. Abilities 
are distinguished by their objects: “abilities relate agents to actions,” though importantly, agents 
also have powers that are not abilities. Abilities are diverse, and include cultivated habits and 
skills both physical and intellectual. Yet humans have many dispositions, bodily or otherwise, 
that are not well described as abilities. Affordances are ecologically-situated  possibility for 
action, choice or experiences, and are what one system provides or furnishes to another system: 
For example, a chair affords sitting to a person. Affordances are modeled as reducible neither to 
dispositions nor to abilities, yet recognition of affordances as powers of human agents relates 
them to action in the natural and social world, and indeed is one of the formative ideas of 
contemporary enactivism (J.J. Gibson, 1979). 
This general taxonomy, I would suggest, makes us less susceptible to treating vices as 
dispositions, or otherwise assuming the Inversion thesis in regard to their attribution to agents or 
their actions. It allows us to better see how emotional recognition is often a social skill, and how 
lack of such skill or habit, and lack of motivation toward some posited aim, do not always match 
up. Recognition of epistemic failings is not tantamount to robust vice-charging, in terms of 
insufficient or deficient love of truth. But I will largely set these taxonomical questions and their 
epistemological consequences aside in order to focus on another. One further major resource for 
motivating Crerar’s concerns over vice attributions and the Inversion thesis, and for 
accommodating the asymmetries he draws attention to, is the rich and extensive literature on 
“thick” evaluative and characterological concepts. Virtue responsibilists are rightly said to be 
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epistemological ‘thickies,’ in that they closely describe dual roles for evaluative thick concepts: 
a) for agents themselves; and b) for philosophical assessment of particular agents and their 
actions. But let us first sharpen Crerar’s critique by quoting him at greater length: 
The upshot of my arguments against the motivational approach, combined with 
the orthodox picture of virtue, is that we are left with an overlooked but 
fundamental asymmetry between virtue and vice. Whilst, for the reasons 
discussed, it makes sense to think of the virtuous agent as characterized by a 
particular motivational state, the same cannot be said for vice. A particular 
orientation towards epistemic goods is necessary for an agent to be intellectually 
virtuous. However, whilst certain such orientations might be sufficient for vice 
there is none that is necessary for, unifying amongst, or characteristic of the 
intellectual vices. Virtue, in short, enjoys a psychological unity that vice does not. 
(762) 
 
One move to qualify the Inversion thesis which Crerar considers is to replace bad motives 
with insufficient motives. This would help account for some of the most apparent asymmetries 
between virtue and vice ascriptions. Abstinence from action, and not just wrongful action can be 
vicious, and harm and suffering are often carried on though culpable indifference which bring 
lack of awareness or care. So it goes some distance towards the foremost concerns of 
ameliorative philosophers such as Kathie Jennie when she writes, “Inattention to morally 
significant matters is pervasive in our society. It is morally problematic in very serious ways. 
How might we combat it?” …[W]e need a way of talking about transforming character: about 
moral self-improvement. Our lack of resources for thinking about such projects plays an 
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important role in self-deception.” Philosophical resources have been missing to analyze self-
deception and the loss of integrity we find in every act of willful or affected ignorance. 
Still, Crerar thinks that the replacement of bad motives with insufficient motives in the 
characterization of intellectual vices is not a very satisfactory “fix” to the problems facing the 
Inversion thesis. Attending to the relatively wider breath and relative lack of unity of vices (or 
vice attributions) which Crerar maintains is the more interesting feature of his challenge to the 
Inversion thesis. As with Jennie, and others such as Michele Moody-Adams who write on 
question of the culpability of agents for their affective ignorance,  there are  deeper problems 
with self-deception, especially in regard to what things one ought to be attentive to, or concerned 
about. A big part of these deeper problems is that self-deception undermines the moral agency of 
the self-deceiver, often in a slow or piecemeal way.  
The shift from poor motives to a mere “lack” or “insufficiency” of proper motivation to 
realize universal moral or epistemic aims still seems unable to help us analyze affective 
ignorance and similar cases. It seems still to leave us without helpful resources to analyze the 
failings we have the concept of affective ignorance to bring to attention. If so, it is because this 
qualification still locates the fault as largely within the motivational structures of individual 
agents, rather than  considering affective ignorance together with those agents’ cultural context 
and the social influences and constraints that actual agents experience. The problem I want to 
highlight is that self-deception undermines agency in episodic, limited ways. Jennie describes it 
as fecund  — self-spreading—  since self-deception is maintained through rationalizations and 
self-serving “re-descriptions” of one’s actions and attitudes. It erodes, but again in very episodic 
or compartmentalized ways, the ability for self-scrutiny. 
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For some of these same reasons, we need to worry about the relationship between 
performance failures, or exhibiting affected ignorance or related vices, and blameworthiness.  
“Blame” might be to misstate the aim of the sorts of censure or critique of bias which we develop 
as appropriate response to the performance failure, and as the natural complement to the 
cooperative problem-solving ameliorative epistemologists count as performance success. 
Ignorance, and even willed ignorance, this is to say, isn’t “blameworthy” in a uniform or 
straightforward sense. Blameworthiness threatens to not just to overstate, but to fundamentally 
misstate the aim of the sorts of censure that much ameliorative epistemology might be limited 
to.16 To use the Deweyan description, philosophy as “critique of bias” is the natural complement 
to positive promotion of cooperative problem-solving, but the censure which such critique entails 
need not endeavor to place blame upon individuals for all of their shortcomings in reflective 
morality. Taking our own ways of ascribing and analyzing traits as the deeper problem, I suggest 
that philosophers need to look for better ways of parsing character-traits, ways which allow their 
important asymmetries with virtues, and in so doing help philosophers to make better sense of 
censure for the use of unsound or bias-mirroring strategies of inquiry. 
Might we replace “blame” with “censure” as a first step to accommodating the worry 
than many forms of censure of discredit fall short of blame, and that making blame-worthiness 
central to manifesting moral or intellectual vice is dubiously given to methodological 
individualism, and to over-ascribing poor motivations to individuals? One of the true originators 
and innovators of dual process theory, Jonathan Evans, writes, “From a pragmatic viewpoint, 
even if people fall prey to certain biases, it does not mean they are irrational [or generally 
unreliable, or ‘vicious’]. Making mistakes can still be part of a rational, or a reliable, or an 
intellectually virtuous agent’s repertoire.17 
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When we ascribe virtues, ethical or epistemic, to an agent, there is a kind of charitability, 
rather than evidential sufficiency, for meeting the motivation component which the 
responsibilists have built into epistemic virtues. The ascription of sound motives may be 
evidentially underdetermined most of the time, yet charitably granted to an agent because the 
success component was met together with other conditions. Charitability is appropriate in such 
cases. But what about the apparent uncharitability of ascribing poor or lacking motivations on 
the basis of lack of successful inquiry? Here the underdetermination of the ascription by 
available evidence should be more troubling, as Cassam notes. It seems that reticence about 
blameworthiness is the charitable thing: Be reticent of ascribing poor or normatively-lacking 
motivations, without better evidence than just correlations with overt judgments of actions 
(occurrent ascriptions). 
This conclusion goes together with the further point that many philosophically useful 
thick evaluative concepts describe action-types, rather than people. People may exemplify them, 
but that does not mean we may attribute vice as a character-trait as often as we attribute virtue. 
This seems especially so in respect to our intellectual faults or shortcomings. Our epistemic 
faults, I suggest, are typically more akin to thick, negatively-valenced evaluative concepts like 
“rude,” “crude,” and “lewd,” than to full blown personological traits on analogue with moral 
vices. With many such perceived faults, it is better to attribute them to unfitting or uneducated 
choice of strategies of inquiry, rather than to failings in the make-up of the individual. We as 
philosophers should mark this difference and be clearer whether we are talking about the 
character-traits of particular people, or  act-exemplified negative thick concepts: A rude remark, 
a crude joke, a lewd gesture, an ill-adapted strategy, dysfunctional or bias-mirroring doxastic 
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method. Arguably, these occurrent ascriptions are ascriptions enough in many cases, and going 
on to a more robust vice ascription is unnecessary and potentially counter-productive.  
The claim here is not that only with moral judgments do act-descriptions point culpability 
at the agent(s) who performed the action. But this is relatively more so with moral (and any 
adopted religious) virtues than with intellectual virtues. Attributions of “blasphemy” and even 
more so of “heresy” are examples of act-focused thick evaluative concept, clearly negatively 
valenced, which points culpability at an agent and not just their action. To avoid modeling 
intellectual vice attributions on examples of this kind, I am suggesting that occurrent trait-
ascriptions are ascriptions enough: a) when assessors do not have solid insight on the 
individual’s motivational states; b) when it is quite unclear how to parcel individual and cultural 
or collective responsibility in a particular case; or c) when rhetorical vice-charging is rampant in 
a particular debate, or in a domain of discourse.  
To summarize thus far, characterological thick concepts (virtues and vices) ascribe 
something different, and often stronger, than act-focused thick concepts such as “rude.” The latter 
take an action or behavior occurrence as their object, while the former ‘get personal’ by attributing 
a personal disposition. We have suggested reasons to think that this difference between 
dispositional and occurrent attributions is as important in epistemology as it is in ethics, but that 
virtue theorists often neglect the resources that come with distinguishing these attributions. More 
clearly distinguishing them, and restricting the tendency to reduce virtues (and especially vices) to 
dispositions I suggest is important for the advancement of the ethics of knowledge.  
It would only be inhibitive of the ameliorative projects of virtue responsibilists to ignore 
the value of  occurrent ascriptions, and focus only on characterological ascriptions as if all the 
important philosophical work, or even just all concern with epistemic justice/injustice, reside there. 
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If character and conduct are indeed ultimately inseparable as pragmatists like Dewey hold, then 
philosophers need to think of dispositional and occurrent attributions as existing on a spectrum 
(rather than virtue theorists focusing on the former, and consequentialists on the latter). If we ask 
how we should go about making virtue epistemologies adequately social and risk-aware, one key 
is to recognize the range or spectrum — the dispositional-occurrent attribution spectrum — and 
not to think that if one is a virtue theorist they must only or primarily be concerned with attributions 
at one end of this spectrum, and not also the spectrum as a whole.18  
This proposal I think still strongly supports the thick descriptive projects which character 
epistemologists develop, but expanding them beyond the characterological subset of them. Our 
later discussion of ‘knavery’ as an occurrent attribution will serve as a brief example of this. The 
proposed self-restriction to occurrent attributions, when they are all that is needed, is more than 
just the charitable thing to do. I would argue that it is also more in keeping with social 
epistemology’s concerns with group and collective virtue and vice: Groups don’t have motives 
or emotional dispositions in the same way individuals do, and there is no way to go ‘inside’ 
them. Character and conduct are especially hard to distinguish when it comes to groups or 
collectives. Because of this, talk of collective virtue and vice logically takes occurrent ascriptions 
as its starting point. At the social level of the ethics of knowledge, occurrent ascription is a 
default position, unless and until faulty motivation is clearly in evidence. Our suggested default 
presumption of agents being reasonably well-motivated to hold true beliefs is more than just the 
charitable thing to do. It accepts certain epistemic arguments supporting reasonable 
disagreement, which John Rawls referred to as the ‘burdens of judgment.’ It insists on more 
‘friendly’ treatment of others. A risk-aware social epistemology needs to be very attentive to 
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what Kidd (2016) terms the distinction between explanatorily robust, and largely rhetorical vice-
charging.  
If the kind of censure which is appropriate to intellectual, just as of moral failings is 
highly contextual, we need to approach it in a way that avoids overgeneralizing the connection 
between judgment and emotion. To elaborate on other lines of support for Crerar’s asymmetry 
thesis, we might find it in the work of Peter Goldie, whose papers on emotions and thick 
concepts explicitly points out the faults of overgeneralizing the connection between judgment 
and emotion. To begin with, Goldie points out that “Thick concepts are not a philosopher’s 
construct, but rather something pervasive in our everyday lives.” In several of his last papers, 
Goldie talks of intellectual as well as moral emotions.19 He thinks of intellectual emotions and 
their relationship to epistemic virtues as pretty much parallel to what one would say in respect to 
moral emotions and moral virtues. But the view he develops in not a version of the Inversion 
thesis: Vices and weaknesses are caused not in the “mirroring” way that would require a bad 
motive or a lack of good motive. Rather he points to the many “vicissitudes of emotional 
dispositions” which can undercut the cultivation of more robust and global virtues. The 
explanation of the failure of habituation to the virtues which Goldie offers is one that pays close 
attention to the “vicissitudes of emotions,” including things like depression, apathy, weakness, 
accidie, sloth, tiredness, and so on. These often lead to a situation where “both judgement and 
action lack the emotionality that is a requirement of virtue.” For Goldie as for the proposal just 
outlined,  explanation of failure still invites a kind of censure, but the appropriate censure may 
fall well short of the blameworthiness associated with attribution of a vice-qua-disposition. 
In Goldie’s 2008 paper “Thick Concepts and Emotion,” he explores the many kinds of 
failings we associate with vice. He affirms a very close connection between emotion and 
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grasping thick concepts, whether positively or negatively valenced, and whether 
characterological (virtues and vices) or occurrent (“helpful,” “rude,” ‘crude,” etc.). But what he 
(along with Bernard Williams) is sharply critical of is the “Generality” which certain 
philosophical accounts aim for: an “ambition of making a general, and, to my mind overly 
simple, connection between judgement and emotion.” 
Accounts which assert or presuppose such generality he finds to be subject to clear 
counter-examples, especially where the ‘virtue’ is culturally-specific (local) rather than 
universal, or when it is applied to a group of people with whom one has a special relationship (an 
ingroup) but not others (for instance honor or loyalty among thieves). The problem with 
presenting an overgeneralized account of emotion in the application of thick concepts is that they 
do not recognize the problems of “a limited domain of fully engaged application.” The father is 
kind to his children, but cruel to his spouse; a woman is kind to her family, but mean to her 
employees at work; a child is honest in school, but dishonest with friends; a nationalist is loyal to 
countrymen, but bigoted towards non-citizens or ethnic sub-groups he chooses to see as cultural 
aliens.20 Such examples are common-place, and very real. Goldie is right that the father is so 
narrow in his “focus of caring” that we should be mistaken to judge him a caring person: He has 
failed to expand his ‘moral circle’ in ethically appropriate ways, and fallen into a trap that 
hindered and limited his moral development.21 But he also seems right that the prevalence of 
such examples is something virtue theorists have yet to adequately address.  
It is hard to know what to say about these people in characterological terms of virtue and 
vice, because their ‘virtues’ are so compartmentalized by domain or “focus.” But a closer look 
still reveals the resources of thick concepts, when we are careful to distinguish their different 
types, and functions. In connection with this, Goldie finds ample room for philosophical and 
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psychological study of “intellectual emotions.”22 Emotion and imagination cannot be divorced 
from sound moral development, and they often play positive and even crucial roles in inquiry. 
But overgeneralization about the connection between judgment and emotion in reflective 
morality, Goldie thinks, is psychologically unmotivated, and makes these tough cases of sharply 
curtailed or localized ‘virtue’ harder for philosophers to analyze. Goldie see this as another 
reason to reject “Generality,” arguing that they are not able to accommodate these and other 
features of our use of thick concepts.23 Proponents of Generality he says are those who settle for 
sincerity in the agent, understood as the connection between a) strength of feeling displayed on 
moral issues, and b) the strength of the moral view taken. But this notion of sincerity, because it 
is over-generalized, offers only a poor tool to help us account for vices and bigotries which result 
from failing to extend one’s kindness, honesty, etc. beyond a specific ingroup.  
Here we more clearly see Goldie’s aim in his paper – to undercut overly generalized 
treatments of connection between judgement and emotion – as thematically connected with 
Crerar’s concerns with the Inversion thesis. Goldie indicates that there is often a logical 
inconsistency behind the moral inconsistency of an agent’s judgment encapsulating narrow or 
seeming arbitrary choice of focus. Indeed, both the logical and moral inconsistency are likely to 
be features which the independent observer will perceive, and take as explanatory, but which are 
not evident to the individual, such as a father figure, again. So, what I take Goldie to be arguing 
is that Generality (and especially the kind of generality carried by the holder of the Inversion 
thesis), cannot help us with the kind of insight which J.S. Mill presents in On Liberty when he 
writes that “the odium theologicum, in a sincere bigot, is one of the most unequivocal cases of 
moral feeling. . . .”  An affective-attitudinal component is indeed present, and even indulged as 
the source of authority for doctrine in this example of religious enthusiasm. With this affective-
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attitudinal component comes the sincerity and engagement with the thick concept (kindness; love 
of country). Yet all of these cases remain ones of failing to expand our moral circle; they are 
cases where the agent has failed to avoid one of the many traps to self-cultivation.24 Each such 
case invites detailed discussion of doxastic risk and responsibility. In ameliorative 
epistemologies, inductive risk management involves concerns with the real-life risks that our 
doxastic practices might harm others or their legitimate interests. An adequately risk aware social 
epistemology will engage examples of such biases with reasoned censure, yet also with 
commitment to educating for habits and skills of fluid rationality, and for the cooperative 
problem solving which such virtues empower.  
To summarize and conclude this section, we have focused on Crerar’s thesis that there is 
substantial asymmetry between virtue and vice attributions, and that this is especially so in 
respect to intellectual virtue and vice attributions. Crerar, like Cassam helps us to see a 
“disunity” to vice. On theses grounds he alleges points out the greater scope of vice attributions, 
in part due to the many blind spots of reason, and how virtues tend to be attributed only with a 
certain breadth and robustness. In replying to Crerar’s argument, and highlighted the importance 
of what Goldie terms “emotional dispositions,” and the close connections between emotions and 
reflective judgment which “engage” with thick concepts. But at the same time, we have sought to 
avoid overgeneralizations about the role of emotions. We have agreed with Goldie that thick 
concepts are key tools for agents engaged in inquiry, and that engagement with them is often the 
agent’s best chance at recognizing their own inconsistencies and failures. And for philosophers 
we have suggested that it is not a fundamental flaw of character epistemology that virtue and 
vice attributions tend to be asymmetrical, but that such asymmetries do demand our study, and 
that we properly distinguish the descriptive, explanatory, and normative issues that arise with 
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these concepts and their use in evaluating agents and their actions. We need, more specifically, to 
better put the dispositional-occurrent attribution distinction to work. When we do, we will not be 
surprised that attributions of a local virtue may at the same time help identify and analyze an 
agent’s blind-spots and associated moral or intellectual vices. This does not negate the 
philosophical value of concepts of virtue and vice. It rather confirms Goldie’s claim that thick 
evaluative concepts “not only help to explain the connection between depth of feelings and 
sincere judgements involving thick concepts; they also help to explain, in ways that no general 
account can aspire to do, our individual inconsistencies” (2008, 94). 
 
Section 4. Knavery and Contemporary Game Theory  
Biological and cultural evolution share a Darwinian explanatory framework involving concepts 
of variation, selection, and reproduction/transmission. But they differ in many important 
respects, including that “cultural selection is subject to a whole range of ‘biases’ that have little 
or no analogue in biological evolution.”25 Biases and heuristics are studied by cognitive as well 
as social psychologists because, generally speaking, they are species wide. In this respect, 
psychology has been showing us with stronger and stronger evidence that, as Michele de 
Montaigne put it, “we are all of the common herd.”26 Culture shapes all of our virtues and vices, 
all of our skills and non-basic abilities or powers. Social epistemologists should be especially 
concerned with knowledge self-ascriptions in domains of controversial views (domains of 
politics, morals, religion, and philosophy), and this means studying the impact on judgment of 
traits which are classified in psychology as social biases. Whether expressed in some form of 
claimed superiority, or the right to dominance of a particular race, gender, nation-state, or 
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religious sect, beliefs and attitudes associated with fundamentalisms or absolutisms invite 
examination as exhibiting us/them or other known group biases.  
Cooperation, our best inheritance from nature, remains frightfully clustered into ingroups, 
where competition rather than cooperation is allowed to define the relationship to other groups. 
Enculturation is a wonderful thing, where an individual's values and personal identity are 
formed. But the moral emotions may never develop to appropriately expand our moral circle. In 
the Chinese classic, The Great Learning, we are born cloistered in upon ourselves but in order to 
cultivate our character must each overcome various recognizable “traps” or barriers to moral 
development. Sympathy, empathy, antipathy, and other moral emotions may not develop in 
people, or egocentric, ethnocentric, anthropocentric biases will take hold and become more 
pronounced marks of their character and their outlook on life, and their politics.  
Virtue theory is centrally concerned with description of thick evaluative and 
characterological concepts. This is one way of incorporating  psychological study of emotional 
and affective experiences into the ethics of knowledge. In connection with the social evolution of 
cooperation, let us introduce one vice which Hume gave name to, manifesting in a person with a  
disposition to prioritize or maximize short-term self-interest, and to devalue collective good, 
cooperation and long-term thinking.  
 
Political writers have established it as a maxim, that in contriving any system of 
government, and fixing the several checks and controls of the constitution, every 
man ought to be supposed a knave, and to have no other end, in all his actions, 
than private interest. By this interest we must govern him, and, by means of it, 
make him, notwithstanding his insatiable avarice and action, cooperate to public 
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good.... It is, therefore, a just political maxim, that every man must be supposed a 
knave; though, at the same time, it appears somewhat strange, that a maxim 
should be true in politics which is false in fact.27 
 
Hume’s “knave” is no doubt an idealized agent as understood in what would become 
classical economics, raising issues which his colleague Adam Smith and others were writing on. 
But by juxtaposing this idealized reasoner with actual agents, Hume is utilizing both ideal and 
non-ideal theories. Acting always to maximize short-term self-interest can be made a rule, and 
the knave is a figure who is at least a self-consistent, and in this sense ‘rational’ agent. But Hume 
also provides fascinating insights into what is today known in Game theory as the problem of 
free-riders on cooperative systems. It is these connections between knavish actions and 
‘cheaters’ on systems of trust which we will pursue.  
Game theory studies how interdependent decision makers make choices. It models 
strategic behavior by agents who understand that their actions affect the actions of  other agents. 
Game theory is also a tool in the study of the evolution of cooperation, where it draws attention 
to how individual and collective rationality often collide, leading to the prioritization of different 
aims and choices. In thought experiments like Tragedy of the Commons, Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
Dictator Games, and Unscrupulous Diner Dilemma, it is easy to see the tensions between 
personally wanting to “optimize” (maximize) a personal outcome, and willingness to “satisfice” 
(take less; compromise),  reflecting acknowledgment of mutual dependence on others, and 
mutuality of interests. The tensions which different strategies in playing these games are oft-
studied in psychology and in decision theory. Co-operative strategies in these games involve 
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willingness to weigh long-term over short term rewards, and collective as well as personal wants 
or interests.  
Humean knavery has instances in corporate actions, as well as in individuals. Instances 
and certainly patterns of corporate knavery we would hope are marked as criterion for exclusion 
or divestment by financial institutions responsive to growing investor demand for ESG 
(environmental; social; governance) investments. Yet much of the practical import of Hume’s 
study is not backwards-looking blame or culpability, but forward-looking anticipation and 
planning: It is of vital importance for decision-making bodies to anticipate knavery in its many 
forms, in order to contain its ill-effects and to maintain the advantages of cooperative reasoning 
and satisfying rationality. Planning, Hume suggests, establishes effective constraints to 
discourage cheating and free riding on systems of trust, while effectively demonstrating the 
shared advantages of cooperation for public good.28 It is vital to promote satisficing as key to 
sustainability and long-term planning, and win-win cooperative thinking, in contrast to 
satisfaction or profit maximization, and short-term thinking about one’s own good. 
Some authors have contested Garrett Hardin’s argument that lack of a strong regulatory 
framework of management can be anticipated to lead to a Tragedy of the Commons with respect 
to our forests, fisheries and other natural resources.29 There is a political debate, of course, 
between libertarian and communitarian thought, and Hume would need arguments to support 
public good as sufficient grounds to design institutions to curtail opportunities for knavish 
actions. But we arguably can find many instances of the clash which Hume draws attention to, 
the clash between individual and collective rationality in many places –even perhaps in the ethics 
of mask-wearing and vaccination-acceptance in an age of pandemic. Of course, attitudes people 
take on these matters often involves further assumptions about the proper balance between 
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positive and negative rights, and it is often over these issues that people’s choices get politicized. 
But the balances or trade-offs between claims on behalf of negative rights (sometimes called 
“liberty rights”) and positive rights (sometimes called “welfare rights”) are another topic that is 
pertinent to the ethics of knowledge, and studyable by social psychologists.30  
In summary of this section, risk-aware social epistemologists draw critical attention to major 
obstacles to justice, and to social cooperation. Humean knavery the harms produced by knavish 
actions, is one such obstacle, and one which Game theory has recently helped elucidate. Hume 
thought that policy makers should model and anticipate cooperation-undermining choices, and 
design institutional practices so that such behavior is discouraged, and public good is promoted. 
In the service of his ameliorative efforts, Hume’s discussion of this cooperative vice of knavery 
recognizes and balances ideal and non-ideal theory, which in the next section we will see are 
instead too often juxtaposed as incompatible by scholars in their assumptions about human 
rationality/irrationality.31 
  
5. Epistemic Paternalism: Between Care and Control 
But putting that aside, social epistemologists should also ask themselves when their view of 
human agency may issue from too skeptical a psychology, or eventuate not in meliorism but in 
an overt epistemic paternalism, where this implies that interferences to inquiry are justified 
without the knowledge or consent of those whose epistemic environment is engineered, or 
manipulated. 
 The ubiquity of human cognitive biases has been and remains a key motivating argument 
for interfering in their inquiry for their own epistemic good. One the one hand, caring and 
altruistic motivations seem to invite, or even to demand epistemically paternalistic interventions. 
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EP’s defenders locate it within ameliorative epistemology, and argue that intelligent 
interventions and choice architectures can in fact be a form of epistemic justice and legitimate 
caring. EP is justified when its specific applications aims and methods respect persons as actual 
knowers, facilitate their epistemic capacities, and ameliorate epistemic injustices. On the other 
hand, the need for agents to develop skills and cultivate virtues of good inquiry and to become 
mature and self-reliant, which paternalistic manipulations of potentially thwart as often as they 
achieve positive effects.  
Today we know that restricted access to information sometimes improves people’s 
reasoning, and supports veritistic outcomes, as for instance in “blinded” scientific experiments 
and in judicial rules prohibiting the disclosure of a defendant’s past criminal profile to a jury. 
Alvin Goldman introduced and defended epistemic paternalism (EP)  early in social 
epistemology’s emergence (1991; 1999), arguing that while these norms produce a kind of 
ignorance, they arose in recognition that it is good for scientists and jurors and sometimes others 
to be protected from their own biases  – “their own ‘folly’” (1991, 126). Humans often reason 
better less information, and if so, there is sometimes epistemic value in ignorance. Defenders of 
EP argue that we cannot depend upon ourselves for self-improvement, and align their defense of 
it with the aims of ameliorative epistemology (Ahlstrom-Vij, 2014). So, both defenders and 
critics of EP have count themselves as proponents of ameliorative epistemology. While 
epistemic paternalists argue that we cannot count upon ourselves for epistemic improvement, 
Goldman acknowledges that legitimate instances of EP must be qualified by such serious 
concerns the scope of control, the rights of citizens, and as the status and power of the 
controlling agent.  
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Injustices are sometimes facilitated through surplus of attributed credibility of testifiers, as 
well as through testimonial credibility deficit. So, an ethics of knowledge should consider when 
an undue skepticism about the robust efficacy of character-trait, or agent competence more 
generally, might become a hinderance to education for doxastic responsibility. When might 
interventions into epistemic practices be legitimate examples of the application of social 
intelligence (Deweyan social experimentation)? And when, instead, might such interventions or 
policies become so over-weaning that they produce or re-enforce the very conditions of citizen 
complacency and incompetence which these interventions ostensibly aim to correct?  
As argued in a recent collection on the topic of epistemic paternalism [author omitted] 
care and control are sometimes entangled in institutional policies, not unlike how they are 
entangled in parenting, or responsibility for others. A sound ethics of knowledge might support, 
on grounds of proper care, various educational or other ‘nudgings’ to redress epistemic injustices 
and conditions which promote radicalization and/or group polarization. Yet, as we witnessed 
with recent debate over the “content moderation policies” of social media firms like Facebook 
and Twitter, paternalistic interventions (through tagging or removal of immoderate content) often 
bring harsh responses as being inconsistent with principles of freedom of speech. While these 
policies have been a political football during the last U.S. election cycle, risk-aware social 
epistemologist can help make debates such as this more tractable. But to do so they must ask 
themselves when certain epistemic justice-seeking projects of ameliorative epistemology 
contribute to epistemic justice, and when they might instead become doubtfully epistocratic.  
In summary, the issues of a vibrant ethics of knowledge should include questions of care and 
control, and the differences between a vertical or hierarchical conception of knowledge-systems, 
and a horizontal or democratized conception. The debate over justified epistemic paternalism 
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associated is important if we hope to bring psychology, philosophy, and education together to do 
a better job of debiasing ourselves and others. Even understanding philosophical activity as 
involving “conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics” involves some aspect of epistemic 
paternalism.32 Attending to the social dimensions of the ethics of knowledge leads to 
examination not just of the justification, but also of the proper limits of epistemic paternalism. 
Attention to social dimensions of the ethics of knowledge is potentially transformational both for 
individual agents and for collectives. It provides stimulus for emotional, moral, and intellectual 
development of agents, and potentially also for reform of practices of collective deliberation and 
decision-making. Especially in its connections with institutional reforms and with justice, an 
ethics of knowledge must forget neither the importance of forethought and planning in choice 
architectures, nor the importance of the individuals’ autonomy, or ability to self-cultivate and 
think for themselves rather than merely to be paternalistically steered toward veritistic goals. So, 
the present study agrees with Candiotto when she writes of the transformative potential for 
redesigning cognitive environments through the emergence of new and different abilities; but it 
argues that ‘imposed’ situation management and educational efforts aimed at growth of character 
and acquisitions of reasoning skills need to be balanced concerns. The final section will argue 
that this proper balance is exhibited by those who take a Meliorist position on human rationality, 
as pragmatists and virtue theorists typically have. 
 
5. Skepticism, Meliorism and Ecological Agency 
Ecological rationality challenges expectations that human reasoners are rational or justified only 
meeting normative evidential standards derived independently of empirical and social 
psychology. It suggests that demands upon rationality be perfectly feasible for agents, 
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computationally speaking, and that norms of epistemic assessment, while still truth connected, 
not be ‘free-floating’ impositions. This split or schism Gigerenzer thinks has served to wrongly 
elevate logic and probability above heuristics; the result is "contrasting the pure and rational way 
people should reason with the dirty in a rational way people in fact do reason." This 
understanding of the norms of reasoning puts thinking and reasoning into tension; it 
dichotomizes them.  
If we start from such maximizing expectations of what constitutes rationality it is easy to 
fall into skepticism about human rationality once biases and heuristics are revealed by 
experimentation. Gigerenzer holds this view as intellectualist and as failing to model agents in 
the actual world of pervasive uncertainty. Many of the issues we have already discussed are 
caught up in what psychologist Keith Stanovich aptly describes as the ‘Great Rationality 
Debate.’ It is a debate which has spanned the sciences, philosophy, and the humanities. As 
mentioned previously, situationist psychology emphasizes the ubiquity of human cognitive 
biases, and automaticity theories, are describable as Skeptics. Skeptics express deep worries 
about human self-ignorance, and the implications it has for normative theories in ethics and 
epistemology.  
Enculturation or upbringing or situational factors are often taken as so influential over 
our moral judgments that Skeptics and Panglossians come to hold different versions of what 
Moody-Adams calls the “Inability thesis,” which broadly exculpates people from moral 
responsibility for their beliefs, attitudes, and actions. Here the flow of causality is one way: 
people are shaped by the cultural influences which came before, but somehow do not also re-
shape their culture through their choices and the reasons they have for them. But for those 
Skeptics who become strong paternalists, moral or epistemic, the determinism under which they 
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see us laboring is also an invitation for paternalistic interventions. Behavior can be  improved 
and epistemic aims enhanced though intelligent design of choice architectures. But the 
determinism which informs the Skeptical stance tend to find issues of doxastic responsibility 
hollow, and reduce favor situation management over, or even in place of character education. 
Meliorism is the stance which dual-process theorists ascribe to, of course together with 
many others. Meliorists acknowledge the data of psychology, but remain optimistic that 
cognitive developmental approaches in psychology will continue to reveal intellectual aspects of 
moral judgment, and emotional aspects of epistemic inquiry. John Dewey is as an earlier 
example, along with Mill mentioned earlier. Risk-aware social epistemology utilizes social and 
cognitive psychology, and does not take ideal theories as most useful to its normative projects. 
Rejection of an over-broad Inability thesis re-opens critical reflection on cases of willed, or 
“affected ignorance.” Moody-Adams defines affected ignorance as “a matter of choosing not 
to be informed of what we can and should know.”33 “Affected ignorance- choosing not to 
know what one can and should know- is a complex phenomenon, but sometimes it simply 
involves refusing to consider whether some practice in which one participates might be 
wrong” (767).  
Neither Skeptics nor Panglossian seem to understand the maxim,  “We live forward!” 
This seemingly simple theme of pragmatist thought actually brings with it a temporal and 
embodied conception of agency, where some of its closest connections with virtue theory are to 
be found. Deweyan/Addams Meliorism and its associated educational experimentalism are 
realistic as to the frailties of the human condition. But they respect and highlight active student 
participation in learning and the role of the imagination in effective learning. Deweyan 
“experimentalism,” as one expression of a melioristic approach, is optimistic and committed to 
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educational innovations. It emphasizes that much of what we learn in inquiry, is how better to 
conduct it. We must start from where we are, and learn how to learn; we start with problems of 
practice, and recognize ourselves as approaching these problems with uncertain or incomplete 
information, varying explanatory goals and methods, etc.  
Dual-Process theorists (hereafter DPT) such as Stanovich also support a modest 
“Meliorist”34 stance in the Great Rationality Debate): “Researchers working in the heuristics and 
biases tradition tend to be so-called Meliorists…. A Meliorist is one who feels that education and 
the provision of information could help make people more rational — could help them more 
efficiently further their goals and to bring their beliefs more in line with the actual state of the 
world.”35 Meliorism as Stanovich and his co-authors develop it, contrasts with overtly Skeptical 
automaticity, ‘vicious mind’ (Olin & Doris) or situationist (Alfano) views on the one hand, and 
frailty-ignoring Apologist/Panglossian views on the other. DPT shows that by our nature we tend 
to conserve the more taxing cognitive effort that comes with engagement of hypothetical reasoning 
and memory-intensive thinking. We are all energy economizers and want to fit strategies to 
problems ecologically when we can, rather than doing all the ‘expensive’ reasoning of ideal 
inquirers qua unbounded reasoners.36 But DPT remains optimistic that cognitive developmental 
approaches in psychology will continue to reveal intellectual aspects of moral judgment, and 
emotional aspects of epistemic inquiry.  
Part of the reason for their cautioned optimism is their confirmation through numerous 
studies that “the intelligence of the new mind is quite variable across individuals” (Evans, 2010, 
209). These differences are largely located not IQ, but in habituation to what Stanovich et. al. refer 
to as “rational thinking dispositions,” and unlike the situationists they reaffirms “individual 
differences as essential components of heuristics and biases research” (Stanovich, 2011). Skeptics 
34 
 
find us predictably irrational, but Stanovich like many others perform studies showing the 
piecemeal improvability of human reasoners and how DPT helps explain it.37  We would see this 
if we stopped dichotomizing between logic and psychology and instead emphasized  the relative 
independence of thinking biases and cognitive ability (Stanovich and West, 2008). “What has been 
ignored in the Great Rationality Debate is individual differences.”  
Meliorists see empirical evidence for competence-performance differences as being 
ignored not only in the dour attitude which influence of Skeptics take towards human rationality, 
but also in rosy attitudes which Panglossians and Apologists take. Social epistemologists, we 
have argued, need to reflect upon the philosophical implications of ecological rationality. They 
relatedly would benefit from paying more attention to the distinction, well-recognized in the 
psychological sciences, between thinking and reasoning (also Manktelow 2012; Elqayam and 
Over 2013). Criteria of censure reflect things like an agent or group relying upon a specific 
strategy of inquiry and inference which is not ecologically sound. This often occurs when agents 
fail to exhibit Type or System 2 mental processing when their context of inquiry is one in which 
our default type of system 1 processing is usually ineffective, or when affective processing is 
ineffective. Overconfidence is often describable psychologically in the language of 
miscalibration. This is closely connected with acting presumptively, and making “risky 
decisions.”38  
More positively, social epistemologists could tie the normative upshot of their work 
habituation to the “critical reasoning dispositions of fluid rationality” which Stanovich and other 
leading cognitive scientists describe. They could offer thicker descriptions of these virtuous 
thinking habits, and integrate them into the strengthened educational tools of the ‘new critical 
thinking’ which takes account of ecological rationality (Thagard 2011; Facione and Gittens 
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2016; Lyons and Ward 2017).39 More specifically, the relationship between virtue ascriptions 
and vice ascriptions, as used both by agents themselves and by philosophers in assessment 
guidance, needs to be constantly re-conceived.40 
While the debate over legitimate epistemic paternalism will continue to evolve, self-
described Meliorists such as Gigerenzer have been cautious of paternalism, and rightly critical of 
justifications of it which presuppose Skepticism about character development or educational 
resources: “The claim that we are hardly educable lacks evidence and forecloses the true alternative 
to nudging: teaching people to become risk savvy” (2015, 361). Meliorists understand themselves 
as caring about the agents intrinsically, and as enabling greater epistemic justice through both 
education and design of institutions and choice-architectures. They take evidence from the social 
sciences and humanities to provide an empirical foundation for ameliorative projects in philosophy 
and education, even if innovations of this sort are always experimental. Education accounts for a 
good deal of the competence-performance differences people show, on tasks which require higher-
order reasoning abilities. Virtue theorists are part of this movement, and indeed some of the 
philosophers most associated with the ‘turn’ to thick description of particular virtues and vices 
have taken this as illuminating the effects of our ecological, or even dual-process mode of 
cognition on moral psychology and philosophy. FitzGerald and Goldie (2012) therefore include 
this complementarity to the findings of contemporary cognitive science as one of the main 
“positive reasons for recommending the use of thick concepts when researching moral 
psychology.” The three main positive reasons for the centrality of thick concepts moral psychology 
and philosophy are:  a) that their study is fruitful in “opening up the moral/non-moral distinction”; 
b)  that “thick concepts [operate at] the intersection of emotional response and moral judgment”; 
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and c) that  “thick concepts and their relation to emotion will throw light on the manner of 
interaction between the two systems in dual process thinking.”41  
In summary, it has been argued (starting from the sides of the ‘Great Rationality Debate’ as 
Keith Stanovich describes it) that our ethics of knowledge should be neither unhelpfully 
Skeptical nor self-servingly Panglossian / Apologetic. It should be Melioristic in its motivations 
and aims, and respectful of agency in the means it adopts.  It should be steadfastly optimistic 
about efforts to ameliorate the human condition through cooperation, but realistic about human 
thinkers in light of psychology, and resigned that for philosophy to mediate between worldviews, 
it must produce a critique of prejudices. 
 In the form of inquiry-focused epistemology, this melioristic effort I have tried to show, 
supplies specific tools for the critique of prejudice to develop and put to work. Thick evaluative 
and characterological concepts are some of the best of these tools. To encourage the evolution of 
social cooperation, and to be less blind to our own bias blind spots, we need ‘new virtues’ which 
habituate us to doxastic responsibility, and lead us to sensitive awareness of testimonial and 
hermeneutic injustices. Epistemologists need to be “risk aware” on several fronts, including that 
of their own efforts at amelioration; they need to be able to convey the importance of doxastic 
responsibility though educational tools which draw attention to agents employing strategies of 
inquiry and inference which ill-fit their subject matter, and to the epistemic injustices which 
reliance upon these ill-fitted strategies so often sustain. 
To conclude, if metacognitive abilities and emotion are ultimately inseparable as 
enactivists hold, then social epistemology should put the though-reason distinction to work in 
their ameliorative projects. As part of this, it has been argued that they need to be moral and 
epistemological ‘thickies,’ but also make good use of the distinction between dispositional and 
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occurrent belief in philosophy of mind. They need to put this distinction to work, in order not to 
conflate projects of assessment and guidance. Navigating flawed thinking and effective skill-
building, especially with uncertain or ambiguous evidence, or contested beliefs and ideologies, is 
a communal project for psychologists and philosophers. When taken on board by philosophers it 
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1 I prefer the active, “ethics of knowing” as the term best fitting my own, and Candiotto’s approach. 
But I defer to this collection’s title on the “ethics of knowledge.” I take this term to marry the 
normative concerns of social, or applied epistemology (where “power and the ethics of knowing” 
was the subtitle to Miranda Fricker’s 2007 book, Epistemic Injustice), to the recent emergence of 
history of knowledge as a methodologically diverse, but more social scientific field of academic 
study. For an overview of the development and purview of history of knowledge as a discipline, 
see Verburgt (2020). 
  
2 As thick concepts, virtues and other evaluative terms such as “rude” and “charitable” contrast 
with thin concepts, such as “good,” “bad,” “right,” and “wrong.” Connecting directly back to 
rejection of a fact-value dichotomy, Julie K. Thorson (2016) clearly explains why virtue theorists 
(and pragmatists) reject dichotomism (which she terms “separatism”): “the view that thick 
concepts cannot be disentangled into two distinct parts, one of which is descriptive and one of 
which is evaluative. This is to assume that thick concepts cannot be broken down into 
components… Separatists claim that thick concepts are composed of a bare evaluative attitude 
(pro or con) and some descriptive content…. [By contrast] Bernard Williams said thick concepts 
‘seem to express a union of fact and value’” (361-2). There is no value-neutral way of applying 
thick concepts; one needs to be engaged with the concept such that they shared the evaluative 
stance or valence, in order to apply the concept in reflective judgment. 
 
3  Virtue theories do not abandon ‘thin’ evaluative concepts, like moral “goodness” or “badness,” 
or “right” and “wrong” action. But their primary concern is with ‘thick’ evaluative and 
characterological concepts. As further background on the thick-thin normativity distinction, 
Bernard Williams and John McDowell both reject “two component” analyses of thick concepts, 
which were first proposed by emotivists and prescriptivists in metaethics. Battaly (2008) points 
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out that Williams, McDowell and others including Peter Goldie “think that thick concepts are at 
once descriptive and evaluative: description and evaluation are entangled and cannot be 
separated into independent components.” In criticism, Blackburn argues that ethical or 
epistemological “thickies” do not champion cognitivism, but rather leave us with no 
independent neutral description, no “semantic anchors” that they can share with others. Battaly 
(2008) and Elgin (2008) respond to Blackburn much as Dewey had earlier responded to C.L. 
Stevenson, on whose emotivist account of evaluative language  most of the logical positivists 
leaned. 
 
4 Max Weber was at pains to make it clear that “the ideal-type and historical reality should not be 
confused with each other” (Weber, 1949 [1904], 107). These are analytical constructs are not 
intended to be empirically adequate but which nevertheless can be used for a variety of theoretical 
purposes. Analogously, it might be helpful to think of the epistemological status of N-theories 
(Morton 2012), and their associated conceptions of rationality as not intending to be empirically 
adequate but nevertheless being useful for a variety of theoretical purposes.  
 
5  Candiotto (2019a, np). See also Candiotto (2017) on “boosting cooperation.” 
 
6 “Participatory sense-making seems to be one of our best options for understanding the role of 
affectivity in epistemic cooperation… we need to endorse an enactivist approach—as 
participatory sense-making, for example—for properly grasping the function of emotions in 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
7 Goldman (2015, 132–3).  
 
8 Eickers and Prinz (2019) argue that emotion recognition involves “scripts.” And that scripts are 
skills because they are improvable, practical, and flexible. This perhaps fits Candiotti’s point, 
because skills are characteristically practical, and active, whereas recognition is often thought of 
as paradigmatically passive. 
 
9 Candiotto quoted from https://www.springernature.com/gp/researchers/campaigns/philosophy-
research/laura-candiotto  ] See also Candiotto (ed.) 2019b. In contrast to the behaviorist 
account of habits as a mechanical reaction to stimuli, the classical pragmatists stressed the 
creative power of habits to scaffold human behaviors. According to this view, habits play a 
positive role in supporting and orienting human sensibility, as well as in sustaining and 
nourishing cognition.  
 
10 Cassam 2020, 16-17. He continues,  “Jeffrey Friedman criticizes the propensity of 
psychologists to ascribe beliefs with which they disagree to the irrationality of those who hold 
them. By the same token, one might criticise the propensity of some vice epistemologists – 
myself, in the past, included – to ascribe political choices with which they disagree to the 
epistemic vices of those who make them… [V]ice explanations can all too easily become a way 
to attack one’s political opponents. It also draws attention to the false consciousness of vice 
epistemologists who see themselves as politically impartial while only ever focusing on the 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
11 Cassam 2020, 19 note 3. See also Kidd’s (2016) distinction between robust and merely 
rhetorical vice-charging.  
 
12  Crerar (2018, 754) continues, “James Montmarquet identifies vice with a “lack of effort” 
(2000: 138-9), Jason Baehr claims that vices involve a “lack of desire for knowledge” (2010: 
209), and Heather Battaly that they require “dis-valuable motivations” [2016b: 106; see also 
2016a]. This assumption is the main target of this paper. In challenging it, however, I also draw 
attention to the limitations of a broader but similarly common assumption regarding the nature 
of vice and its relationship to virtue.” 
 
13 Crerar, 765. One question would be whether the symmetry in regard to motivation is 
philosophically suspect even for moral virtues and vices, and not just intellectual virtues and 
vices. But another is whether intellectual virtues can be modeled as Zagzebski’s neo-
Aristotelian “pure virtue theory” did in Virtues of the Mind, or whether a more naturalistic  
approach is in order. 
 
14 Cassam, indeed, has been as critical of certain assumptions in Zagzebski’s neo-Aristotelian 
approach as Crerar (or for that matter, as situationist psychologists like Alfano and Doris). But 
a qualification is in order here, since there are also serious differences between Crerar and 
Cassam. While he does not hold Cassam to have made Inversion assumption, he notes that 
Cassam “approaches the analysis of character vices from a consequentialist perspective.” 
Crerar goes on to express “reservations about employing virtue-theoretic language to describe 
purely consequentialist phenomena… The language of virtue and vice, at least within the 
48 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
responsibilist tradition, is distinctive and normatively strong; vice is more than simply a sub-
optimal inability, it’s a fault or flaw” (754, note 2). 
 
15 “Let us reserve the word ‘power’ for that general class. … Being a power of an agent is not, 
however, a sufficient condition for being an ability. This is because agents have powers that are 
not abilities. Therefore, second, abilities need to be distinguished by their objects: abilities relate 
agents to actions” (np). So, this approach may go some distance towards responding to Robert 
Siscoe’s further arguments alleging “No work for disposition” (2019) as an objection to robust 
virtue epistemologies, and perhaps anti-luck virtue epistemologies as well.  Siscoe’s negative 
arguments also support some of Crerar’s case against the inversion thesis, since he focuses 
criticism on “proposals enlisting dispositions in a theory of epistemic justification,” of which, 
similarly to Crerar, he finds exemplified in Sosa’s early work, and in many other proponents of 
VE.  
 
16 My argument is thus counter-point to Ball (2016). Applying Zagzebski’s approach and 
extending it to theory of argumentation, Ball argues that “fallacies may not only be improper 
‘moves’ in an argument, but may also reveal something lacking in the arguer’s intellectual 
character.” My claim is that this is not necessarily so, and that especially in cases of inattention 
or morally or epistemically relevant factors, it is often best not to take weak or fallacious 
argumentation as indicative of robust intellectual vice. The question is highly contextual, much 
as the informal fallacies themselves are. 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
18 Schwitzgebel (2019, np) points out that philosophers often distinguish dispositional from 
occurrent believing. “This distinction depends on the more general distinction 
between dispositions and occurrences.” 
  
19 “A number of philosophers have recently argued persuasively for the existence of intellectual 
emotions. These include emotions such as de-light, wonder, awe, fascination, courage, surprise, 
worry, doubt, curiosity, concern, tenacity, and hope, some of which are found elsewhere, other 
than when directed towards intellectual objects, and some of which are more exclusive to 
intellectual matters” (Goldie 2011, 96). 
 
20 All of these examples of pro-attitudes but of “limited domain” are reasons why Goldie would 
say that virtue ascription to an individual should often be withheld, despite there being some 
good aim and motive in respect to a favored ingroup or special relationship. For they are often 
equally as well failures to extend this same pro-attitude more broadly. Psychologically, then, 
“full engagement with a thick concept, and correlatively its action-guidingness in application 
by that person, need not apply across all domains. One can be fully engaged with a concept 
here but not there.” Yet philosophically this engagement, even if it seems to involve the 
expected emotional disposition, is not virtue in the universal or human sense if its scope is 
arbitrarily curtailed on unprincipled grounds or morally-irrelevant factors. 
 
21 Comparing Asian virtue ethics, “Devotion to family is a virtue” (Mulan, Disney 2020); but so 
it would also be of devotion to “clan” or “tribe.” Surely, for the wise, the attribution of devotion 
or related, other-regarding virtues come with qualification, with recognition of traps of 
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“nepotism,” “tribalism,” etc. where no more inclusive units are granted moral status. Indeed, it 
is by expanding the moral circle, which Tu Weiming (1994) associates with the ancient 
Chinese “Great Learning,” that we can most gain perspective, and judge the father in Goldie’s 
example to have fallen into one of the most basic of “traps” ensnaring reflective morality. For 
the father, the focus to which his kindness is limited has limited his success in moral self-
cultivation; it has left him ensnares by a strong bias. It is not as if all ‘wound morals’ are whole 
partial or impartial. Peter Singer develops an analogous use of the expanding moral circle in his 
book by that title (Singer 2011).  
 
22 “These include emotions such as de-light, wonder, awe, fascination, courage, surprise, worry, 
doubt, curiosity, concern, tenacity, and hope, some of which are found elsewhere, other than 
when directed towards intellectual objects, and some of which are more exclusive to 
intellectual matters” (Goldie 2011, 96).  
 
23 States of  character, Goldie holds, should be distinguished from their associated emotional 
disposition: “[A] a state of character does not have a focus in the same way as an emotional 
disposition.” A compassionate person, one with the character trait, “will be compassionate 
towards all sorts of things; his disposition does not have a particular focus. Whereas a person 
who is compassionate towards vagrants does have a focus, namely vagrants, and this person 
might not be disposed to express compassion towards other kinds of things.” In such cases “we 
rightly withhold the attribution of a general character trait—a virtue or a vice—to that person.”  
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24 It is often better to think of agents who defect or act knavishly as ensnared by afflictive, in 
contrast to healthy emotions, and emotional processing, and their dysfunctional choices as 
indicative of weak emotional and intellectual development or self-cultivation. I do not find the 
language of self-cultivation, or expanding moral circle, associated with Asian virtue ethics, out 
of place. Indeed, in the first statement of enactive cognitive science, Embodied Mind: Cognitive 
Science and Human Experience, the authors Varela, Rosch and Thompson integrate a number of 
Buddhist themes. To these I add the usefulness of the distinction in Buddhist thought between 
Healthy and Afflictive Emotions.  
 
 
25 From https://philevents.org/event/show/85906. 
 
26 Montaigne (Frame, 611; 429). We expect some effects of bias, because biases are sometimes 
just heuristics, that is, ecological shortcuts in how we come to make judgements. But biases 
affect the judgments of individuals by degrees, and because we are social creatures, individual 
bias cannot be conceived wholly independently of social bias. 
 
27 David Hume (1963 [1741]), 40-42. 
 
28 Trust and epistemic dependence go hand in hand. But trust is hard won, and often more easily 
damaged than constructed. The assessment of testimonial claims and sources of claims is 
anyway an area where our judgments are often parochial and deeply influenced by directional 
thinking and a range of cultural influences. Cooperation isn’t all on the side of trust against 
distrust, since favoritism and in-group bias is not proper trust but rather mistrust. Mistrust 
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carries negative valence stronger than distrust, which could be said just to be descriptive of the 
quality of a relationship. 
 
29 See Mark Van Vugt (2009) for an excellent article on anticipating and controlling knavish 
behaviors. 
 
30 That others wear masks in public spaces during a pandemic will likely benefit me even if I opt 
out, since my risk of contracting a disease might be substantially lower than if more people all 
acted as I do. If I don’t wear a mask, or get an available vaccination, then I raise the risk to 
others, including others who take such precautions either for their own sake, for the sake of 
those who they have a special relationship with, or simply for the sake of public health and 
respect for others. So, at least when those who don’t comply with health guidelines base their 
decision to opt out largely on convenience to themselves, or an estimate of only their personal 
risk of disease contraction and without also weighing collective interest or public good, it is 
easy to see aspects of Game theory’s free-rider or ‘cheater’ strategies behind their behavior. 
 
31 Co-responsibility for harms is a related concern, though I haven’t space to do discuss it in 
detail. Many large-scale harms appear to fall into a category where contributors to the harm may 
have little in common apart from their causal involvement of that harm. Greenhouse effect, over-
farming or over-fishing, etc., are oftentimes overdetermined by non-collective sets of acts, 
complicating attributions of responsibility. Bjorn Petersson (2013) notes that with such cases, 
“Disproportionality between size of causal contribution and intuitions about fair share of blame 
show that justifications of blame should be sensitive to a variety of factors besides causal 
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involvement” (865). These complicating factors include intent, but also whether causal links 
between acts and effects were detectable by agents.  
 
32 Critique and censure are paternalistic activities, in so far as their aim is to ameliorate 
something in the addressee  – to tell them what they need to do, or to hear. Debate over epistemic 
paternalism is implied in what Herman Cappelen, David Plunkett & Alexis Burgess (2019, 1) 
refer to as “conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics”: “Conceptual engineering and 
conceptual ethics are branches of philosophy concerned with questions about how to assess and 
ameliorate our representational devices (such as concepts and words). It's a part of philosophy 
concerned with questions about which concepts we should use (and why), how concepts can be 
improved, when concepts should be abandoned, and how proposals for amelioration can be 
implemented.” And as Pollock (2019, 81) points out,  projects of conceptual engineering 
“seek conceptual change in order to contribute to the dismantling of oppressive social structures, 
institutions, and systems of belief…. Many ameliorative projects aim at moral goods such as 
social equality. For example, the amelioration of the concept MARRIAGE forms part of efforts 
to achieve equal rights for the LGBT+ community.” 
 
33 Moody-Adams, 768. As she writes, “One of the most influential philosophical views about 
cultural impediments to responsibility involves the claim that sometimes one’s upbringing in 
a culture simply renders one unable to know that certain actions are wrong” (764).  
 
34 See especially Stanovich, West, and Toplak (2008) and (2012).  
 
35 Stanovich 2012, 347.  
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36 See also David Matheson (2006). The standard view in the cognitive sciences is associated 
with unbounded rationality. Criticizing ideal theories as much in psychology as philosophy, 
Gigerenzer objects that "Mortal beings figuring out how to act in the world are routinely 
modeled as if they have unlimited computational power, possess complete information about 
their situation, and compute the optimal plan of action to take" (2012, 497). In yet another 
reference to the ill-effects of the fact/value dichotomy, Gigerenzer blames the institutionalized 
division of labor between principles based upon the "is" and "ought" division: "Until recently, 
the study of cognitive heuristics has been seen as a solely descriptive enterprise, explaining 
how people actually make decisions. The study of logic and probability, by contrast, has been 
seen as answering the normative question of how one should make decisions" (496). 
 
37 Stanovich 2012, 359. Nancy Snow relatedly responds to situationism by conceding that virtues 
“might start out by being local,” while explaining why  “they need not remain so” (2009, 37).  
 
38 There are many effects of knowledge miscalibration (i.e., a found or hypothesized inaccuracy 
in subjective knowledge relative to objective knowledge) which scientists have investigated, 
ranging from consumer purchase decisions and consumption patterns to affects in domains of 
controversial views. The evaluation of evidence that is unknown or missing has enormous 
effects on overconfidence; recognition or neglect of unknowns is shown to be an important 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
39 More educators of critical thinking are accepting that we need to teach to biases and ‘mind-
traps,’ and not just informal and formal fallacies. Education for virtuous intellectual habits and 
skills needs to acknowledge Paul Thagard’s point that philosophers should not expect thinking to 
be like formal argumentation, and that deductive inferential abilities are not the standard against 
human judgment in the wild should be measured: “From the perspective of research in psychology 
and neuroscience, human inference is a process that is multimodal, parallel, and often emotional, 
which makes it unlike the linguistic, serial, and narrowly cognitive structure of rationality” (2011, 
152). 
 
40 This relationship has been thought of in terms of differences between ethics and epistemology, 
and sometimes between virtue reliabilists and responsibilists, or even virtue epistemologists and 
vice epistemologists. But these distinctions are far less prescient, and while epistemological tasks 
of assessing and providing guidance are themselves to be distinguished, both are best approached 
in psychological awareness of the relative independence of thinking biases and a person’s 
cognitive ability (Stanovich et. al.). 
 
41 FitzGerald and Goldie, 2012, 231-232. For more on education and “thick” epistemology, see 
Kotzee 2011. 
42 The work of Adam Morton also helps bridge this divide; Morton (2012) recognizes the varied 
role of “N-theories” and how they can help with normative assessments, but also their 
limitations especially with respect to guidance, and their blindness with respect to the roles of 
emotion and imagination (2013).  
 
